Bimetallism and its discontents: cooperation and coordination failure in the empire’s monetary politics, 1549–59

Oliver Volckart

LSE Research Online Documents on Economics from London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library

Abstract: The article uses new sources to review the hypotheses that Charles V's currency bill of 1551 failed because of the electoral-Saxon resistance against the undervaluation of the taler that it stipulated, or because the emperor was too weak to overcome the estates' resistance to collective action in monetary policies. The study shows that these issues were overshadowed by the dispute about whether a bimetallic currency should be established. Charles V's currency bill failed because the Diet of Augsburg (1550–51) asked the emperor to publish it before all open issues had been resolved. This request placed the emperor in a dilemma where he had to make a decision but could not do so without antagonising important parties. It was the result of a coordination failure at the level of the Empire, which in turn was a consequence of a lack of continuity among those personnel involved in shaping monetary policies.

Keywords: monetary politics; currency unions; coinage; bimetallism; early modern history (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E50 H10 H60 N10 N40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-07-31
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Published in Vierteljahresschrift fur Sozial und Wirtschaftsgeschichte, 31, July, 2018, 105(2), pp. 201-220. ISSN: 0340-8728

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Working Paper: Bimetallism and its discontents: cooperation and coordination failure in the empire’s monetary politics, 1549-59 (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ehl:lserod:90507

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