Institutional and Regulatory Frameworks of Privatisation and FDI: A Comparative Study between Egypt and Argentina

Rania Ihab Naguib
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Rania Ihab Naguib: University of Bath

No 20/09, Department of Economics Working Papers from University of Bath, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper aims at investigating the difference between the Egyptian and Argentinean approach to privatisation and FDI and how their different policies, institutions and regulations affected the progress of their respective privatisation programmes and FDI participation. The analysis indicates that, in Egypt, the legal framework of privatisation did not explicitly incorporate FDI participation. FDI regulations were developed separately from privatisation regulations. As a result, a foreign investor in Egypt is faced with multiple laws and multiple regulating agencies for FDI. Unlike in Argentina, the legal framework of privatisation explicitly incorporated the participation of FDI, and FDI regulations were totally liberalised. This explains why FDI participation in Argentine privatisation during 1989 – 2000 accounted for 63% of privatisation proceeds, while, in Egypt, FDI participation accounted for only 24% of privatisation proceeds during 1993 – 2000.

Keywords: egypt; fdi; argentina; regulations; privatisation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-cwa and nep-reg
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eid:wpaper:15959

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