Social Identity and Punishment
Jeffrey Butler,
Pierluigi Conzo and
Martin Leroch
No 1316, EIEF Working Papers Series from Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)
Abstract:
Third party punishment is crucial for sustaining cooperative behavior. Still, little is known about its determinants. In this paper we use laboratory experiments to investigate a long-conjectured interaction between group identification and bystanders' punishment preferences using a novel measure of these preferences. We induce minimal groups and give a bystander the opportunity to punish the perpetrator of an unfair act against a defenseless victim. We elicit the bystander's valuation for punishment in four cases - when the perpetrator, the victim, both or neither are members of the bystander's group. We generate testable predictions about the rank order of punishment valuations from a simple framework incorporating group-contingent preferences for justice which are largely confirmed. Finally, we conduct control sessions where groups are not induced. Comparing punishment across treatment and control suggests that third-party punishers tend to treat others as in-group members unless otherwise divided.
Pages: 27 pages
Date: 2013, Revised 2013-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-evo, nep-exp, nep-hpe, nep-pol and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)
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Working Paper: Social Identity and Punishment (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eie:wpaper:1316
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