Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Deaths' Events

Julien Sauvagnat and Fabiano Schivardi

No 2010, EIEF Working Papers Series from Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF)

Abstract: Using exhaustive administrative data on Italian social security records, we construct measures of local labor market tightness for executives that vary by industry and location. We then show that firm performance is negatively affected by executives death, but only in thin local labor markets. Death events are followed by an increase in the separation rate for the other executives, in particular for those with a college degree. Consistent with the hypothesis that the drop in performance is due to executives' short supply, we find that after a death event executives wages in other firms increase, but only in thin markets.

Pages: 48 pages
Date: 2020, Revised 2020-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.eief.it/eief/images/WP_20.10.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Death Events (2024)
Working Paper: Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Deaths' Events (2020)
Working Paper: Are Executives in Short Supply? Evidence from Deaths' Events (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eie:wpaper:2010

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in EIEF Working Papers Series from Einaudi Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Facundo Piguillem ().