INVESTMENT IN ANTI-COUNTERFEIT LABEL FOR BRANDED FIRM -TAKE MAOTAI AS AN EXAMPLE

Ran Wang () and Weiwei Yang ()
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Ran Wang: Georgia Institute of Technology, USA
Weiwei Yang: Georgia Institute of Technology, USA

Eurasian Journal of Economics and Finance, 2016, vol. 4, issue 3, 43-53

Abstract: The paper examines the anti-fake investment for the branded product market. Through the analysis of the special branded market, the conditions for the sustainable naturalized anti-fake equilibrium and subsidized anti-fake equilibrium are given. The paper shows that when the profit loss with entry deterrence is small, naturalized anti-fake equilibrium exists. When profit loss is intermediate, subsidized equilibrium exists. However, when profit loss with entry deterrence is really large, it would be beneficial to the society to have some degree of fake product and antifake is harmful to the society.

Keywords: Naturalized Anti-fake Equilibrium; Subsidized Anti-fake Equilibrium; Entry Deterrence (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ejn:ejefjr:v:4:y:2016:i:3:p:43-53

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