Manipulability of Voting Procedures, Strategic Voting ad Strategic Nomination

Frantisek Turnovec

No 9223, EcoMod2016 from EcoMod

Abstract: In this paper the concepts of manipulation as strategic voting (misrepresentation of true preferences) and strategic nomination (by adding, or removing alternatives) are investigated. The connection between Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems is discussed from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability. Two famous social choice theorems are related to the problems of dictatorship and manipulability. While the Arrow’s “impossibility” theorem is usually associated with non-existence of non dictatorial social preference function, the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem shows that any non-dictatorial non-degenerate social choice function is manipulable. In fact, many authors observe that the both theorems are closely related (Reny, 2000). In this paper we try to reformulate Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability. In this paper we try to reformulate Arrow’s and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorems from the viewpoint of dilemma between dictatorship and manipulability.

Keywords: Czech Republic; Game theoretical models; Public finance and tax issues (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2016-07-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
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