Differences in wage-determination systems between regular and non-regular employment in a Kaleckian model
Ryunosuke Sonoda and
Hiroaki Sasaki
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Ryunosuke Sonoda: Faculty of Economics, Saga University, Japan
Review of Keynesian Economics, 2019, vol. 7, issue 3, 341-360
Abstract:
In this study, we build a Kaleckian model incorporating institutional differences between the wage determination of regular employment and that of non-regular employment. In our model, three types of wage-bargaining regimes are defined based on how regular workers' collective wage bargaining affects the real wage rate of non-regular workers. We investigate the stability conditions of the dynamical system under each combination of demand regimes and wage-bargaining regimes. We also conduct comparative static analysis and show that the effects of changes in the parameters are diverse depending on combinations of demand regimes and wage-bargaining regimes.
Keywords: wage gap; regular and non-regular employment; demand-led growth model (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E12 E25 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2019
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Related works:
Working Paper: Differences in Wage-Determination Systems between Regular and Non-Regular Employment in a Kaleckian Model (2015) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:elg:rokejn:v:7:y:2019:i:3:p341-360
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