Risque relatif et sélection d'équilibre dans un jeu de coordination: une analyse expérimentale

Dimitri Dubois (), Marc Willinger and Phu Nguyen-Van

No 2006-20, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: We compare the experimental results of three stag-hunt games. In contrast to Battalio et al.(2001), our design keeps the relative riskiness of the two strategies at a constant level as the optimisation premium is increased. Furthermore, we also test the effect of a decrease of the relative riskiness of the two strategies, when the optimization premium remains constant. Our results show that in the latter case, the frequency of the risk-dominant strategy increases sharply, while in the former case the frequency of the risk-dominant strategy is unaffected. However, we confirm the earlier findings of Battalio et al. that an increase of the optimisation premium, all things equal, favours best response and sensitivity to the payoff-history.

Keywords: coordination; sélection d’équilibre; expériences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C92 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2006
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-exp
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2006-20.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2006-20

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefania Marcassa ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).