Incomplete Regulation, Competition and Entry in Increasing Returns to Scale Industries

Sara Biancini

No 2009-08, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: The paper analyzes the effects of liberalization in increasing returns to scale industries. It studies the optimal regulation of an incumbent competing with an unregulated strategic competitor, when public funds are costly. The model shows a trade off between productive and allocative efficiency. Moreover, the welfare gains of liberalization, as compared with regulated monopoly, are a non monotonic function of the cost of public funds. Finally, in the case of severe cash constraint of the government, incomplete regulation may also dominate full regulation of duopoly.

Keywords: Incomplete Regulation; Asymmetric Information; Incentives; Cost of Public Funds. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L43 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-mic and nep-reg
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2009-08.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Incomplete Regulation, Competition, and Entry in Increasing Returns to Scale Industries (2010)
Working Paper: Incomplete Regulation, Competition and Entry in Increasing Returns to Scale Industries (2010)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2009-08

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefania Marcassa ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).