Fair Apportionment in the Italian Senate: Which Reform Should Be Implemented?
Fabrice Barthélémy (fabrice.barthelemy@uvsq.fr),
Gabriele Esposito,
Mathieu Martin and
Vincent Merlin (vincent.merlin@unicaen.fr)
No 2011-16, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise
Abstract:
In this paper we analyze the fairness of the 2007 reform proposal concerning the apportionment of the seats between the regions for the Italian Senate. Theory of power indices is used to compare the actual case with the proposed one. Two scenarios are proposed, senators belonging to the same region voting in blocks and senators voting according party lines, using both the Impartial Culture and the Impartial Anonymous Culture models. Our objective is to determine which apportionment is closer to the equal distribution of power among the citizens. In addition, we will seek for apportionments that are closer to the ideal representation than the ones proposed by politicians. We will also derive the probability that different apportionments produce a referendum paradox, i.e. exhibit a majority in the Senate different from the national popular majority.
Keywords: Power index; Banzhaf; Italian Senate; apportionment; voting paradox; Monte Carlo simulation. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-gth
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2011-16
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