Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom?

Sébastien Courtin, Boniface Mbih and Issofa Moyouwou ()
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Issofa Moyouwou: University of Yaounde I

No 2012-37, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: A Condorcet social choice procedure elects the candidate that beats every other candidate under simple majority when such a candidate exists. The reinforcement axiom roughly states that given two groups of individuals, if these two groups select the same alternative, then this alternative must also be selected by their union. Condorcet social choice procedures are known to violate this axiom. Our goal in this paper is to put this important voting theory result into perspective. We then proceed by evaluating how frequently this phenomenon is susceptible to occur.

Keywords: Condorcet; procedures; •; Reinforcement; axiom; •; Likelihood; •; Impartial; culture; •; Impartial; anonymous; culture (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pub
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom? (2014)
Working Paper: Are Condorcet procedures so bad according to the reinforcement axiom? (2014)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2012-37

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