Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games

Sébastien Courtin and Matias Nuñez

No 2013-27, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: This work provides necessary and sufficient conditions for the dominance solvability of approval voting games. Our conditions are very simple since they are based on the approval relation, a binary relation between the alternatives. We distinguish between two sorts of dominance solvability and prove that the most stringent one leads to the election of the set of Condorcet Winners whereas this need not be the case for the weak version.

Keywords: Approval voting; Strategic voting; Dominance-solvability; Condorcet Winner (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Dominance solvable approval voting games (2017)
Working Paper: Dominance Solvable Approval Voting Games (2013)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2013-27

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