The q-Condorcet efficiency of positional rules

Sébastien Courtin, Mathieu Martin and Issofa Moyouwou ()
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Issofa Moyouwou: University of Yaounde I, Department of Mathematics,

No 2013-29, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: According to a given quota q, a candidate a is beaten by another candidate b if at least a proportion of q individuals prefer b to a. The q-Condorcet efficiency of a voting rule is the probability that the rule selects a q-Condorcet winner (q-CW), that is any candidate who is never beaten under the q-majority. Closed form representations are obtained for the q-Condorcet efficiency of positional rules (simple and sequential) in three-candidate elections. This efficiency is significantly greater for sequential rules than for simple positional rules.

Keywords: Positional; rules; (Simple; and; Sequential); •; Condorcet; efficiency; •; q-majority (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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