Bargaining through Approval

Matias Nuñez and Jean-François Laslier

No 2014-06, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: The paper considers two-person bargaining under Approval Voting. It first proves the existence of pure strategy equilibria. Then it shows that this bargaining method ensures that both players obtain at least their average and median utility level in equilibrium. Finally it proves that, provided that the players are partially honest, the mechanism triggers sincerity and ensures that no alternative Pareto dominates the outcome of the game.

Keywords: Bargaining; Approval Voting; Efficiency; Partial Honesty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-hpe and nep-mic
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining through Approval (2015)
Working Paper: Bargaining through Approval (2015)
Working Paper: Bargaining through Approval (2015)
Working Paper: Bargaining through Approval (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2014-06

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