Multi-Stage Voting and Sequential Elimination with Productive Players

Matias Nuñez, Gabriel Desranges () and Mathieu Martin
Additional contact information
Gabriel Desranges: Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Gabriel Desgranges

No 2014-07, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: This paper analyzes a sequential voting mechanism that eliminates at each round one candidate, until only one of them is left (the winner). The candidates are the voters and they only differ across their skill level. The payoff allocated to the winner depends on the sequence of elimination of the players’ skills, the rest of the players receiving a payoff of zero. We fully characterize the equilibria of the game with two skills. The winner must be a high-skilled player if there is an initial majority of strong types. On the contrary, a high-skilled player might win with an initial majority of weak players independently of the size of the majority. For an arbitrary number of types, if some type of candidates form a strict majority at the first stage, the winner belongs either to the majoritarian type or to a more skilled one.

Keywords: strategic voting; backward induction; dynamic voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/documents/2014-07.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2014-07

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefania Marcassa ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).