Costly information acquisition and the temporal resolution of uncertainty

Daniele Pennesi ()

No 2015-01, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: This paper studies the choice of an individual who acquires information before choosing an action from a set of actions, whose consequences depend on the realization of a state of nature. Information processing can be costly, for example, due to limited attention. We show that the preference of the individual over sets of actions, is completely characterized by a preference for early resolution of uncertainty who becomes indifference when facing degenerate choices. When information acquisition is no longer part of the decision process, the individual is indifferent to the timing of resolution of uncertainty and she behaves according to the subjective learning model of Dillenberger et al. (2014).

Keywords: Costly Information acquisition; Menu Choice; Rational Inattention; Timing of Resolution of Uncertainty (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D8 D9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic and nep-upt
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Journal Article: Costly information acquisition and the temporal resolution of uncertainty (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2015-01

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