Organizational Belief, Managerial Vision, and International Trade

Jaewon Jung (ecoase@googlemail.com)
Additional contact information
Jaewon Jung: Université de Cergy-Pontoise, THEMA

No 2017-26, THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise

Abstract: In this paper, we develop a simple general-equilibrium trade model in which heterogeneous workers make an investment decision in acquiring advanced managerial skills and choose their optimal effort level based on their own individual organizational beliefs and CEO’s managerial vision. In doing so, we show how trade liberalization and/or changes in managerial vision of CEO may lead to non-monotonic income changes within firms due to the interaction between workers’ beliefs and CEO’s managerial vision. Whether a stronger (or weaker) CEO’s managerial vision benefits the firm or not depends on its extent relative to workers’ overall beliefs, and may involve some winners and losers within firms.

Keywords: Organizational belief; Managerial vision; Organizational change; International trade. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F16 F66 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec and nep-int
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://thema.u-cergy.fr/IMG/pdf/2017-26.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ema:worpap:2017-26

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in THEMA Working Papers from THEMA (THéorie Economique, Modélisation et Applications), Université de Cergy-Pontoise Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Stefania Marcassa (stefania.marcassa@u-cergy.fr this e-mail address is bad, please contact repec@repec.org).