Board Structure Variety in Cooperatives

George Hendrikse and Jerker Nillson

ERIM Report Series Research in Management from Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam

Abstract: This paper investigates why agricultural cooperatives exhibit different principles for the allocation of decision rights between the Board of Directors and the Management. A mass-action interpretation of the Nash equilibrium in an investment proposal game shows that, on the one hand, board structure variety is an equilibrium outcome while, on the other, the Traditional model (the board has full control) and the Management model (the professional management makes up the Board of the cooperative society) perform better than the Corporation model (the Management is in full control of the cooperative firm).

Keywords: Internal governance; Board of Directors; Management; decision rights; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 14
Date: 2022-05-30
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-hme
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