Matching through institutions

Francis Bloch, David Cantala () and Damián Gibaja ()
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David Cantala: El Colegio de México
Damián Gibaja: Universidad Popular Autónoma del Estado de Puebla

Serie documentos de trabajo del Centro de Estudios Económicos from El Colegio de México, Centro de Estudios Económicos

Abstract: We model a matching market with institutions -inspired by the assignment of social housing in Paris- as a three-sided market. Institutions own objects and have agents attached to them. Agents have preferences over objects. Objects have priorities over institutions. We show that fair assignments satisfying distributional constraints may fail to exist, and propose a sufficient condition -the over-demand condition- under which we prove existence. Existence derives from the construction of a new algorithm, the Nested Deferred Acceptance (NDA) algorithm, which combines a one-to-one matching between agents and objects and a one-to-many matching between objects and institutions. If interrupters are eliminated from the preference list, as in Kesten (2010), the NDA algorithm produces an assignment which is fair, Pareto optimal among fair assignments and strategy-proof for agents.

Keywords: matching; institutions; deferred acceptance algorithm; social housing (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D47 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dcm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-ure
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https://cee.colmex.mx/dts/2017/DT-2017-3.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Matching through institutions (2020)
Working Paper: Matching through Institutions (2020)
Working Paper: Matching through Institutions (2020)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:emx:ceedoc:2017-03

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