A model of airport slot allocation with posted prices

Nicolas Gruyer and Kevin Guittet
Additional contact information
Nicolas Gruyer: LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC
Kevin Guittet: DSNA/DTI/R&D

No 5, Economics Working Papers from LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school)

Abstract: In this paper, we study the impact of the introduction of posted prices in the slot allocation process currently in use at congested airports in most European countries. In particular, we show that if the airport is initially saturated, while low level of slot prices entail no response from the airlines, requests for slots ”suddenly and violently” drop when the price reaches a certain threshold. In general, there is therefore no market clearing price for airport slots. We also present a dynamic model which highlights how the current grandfather rule - stating that slots used today are kept in the future - generates baby-sitting, that is airlines requiring and using slots today just because they expect them to be profitable in the future.

Keywords: Capacity-constrained competition; airport slots (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L10 L93 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 31 pages
Date: 2008-10-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-mic and nep-ure
Note: Type of Document - pdf; pages: 31.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://gruyern.free.fr/wpaper/gruyerguittet.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:enc:abcdef:airportslots5

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Working Papers from LEEA (air transport economics laboratory), ENAC (french national civil aviation school) Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).