Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets – Part I: Concept Analysis

Mahir Sarfati, M.R. Hesamzadeh and Pär Holmberg
Additional contact information
M.R. Hesamzadeh: Electricity Market Research Group (EMReG), KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Sweden.

No EPRG 1837, Working Papers from Energy Policy Research Group, Cambridge Judge Business School, University of Cambridge

Keywords: Two-stage game; Zonal pricing; Two-stage equilibrium problem with equilibrium constraints; Wholesale electricity market (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C61 C63 C72 D43 L13 L94 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-gth
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Working Paper: Increase-Decrease Game under Imperfect Competition in Two-stage Zonal Power Markets Part I: Concept Analysis (2018)
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