Spectators versus stakeholders with or without veil of ignorance: the difference it makes for justice and chosen distribution criteria

Leonardo Becchetti, Giacomo Degli Antoni (), Stefania Ottone and Nazaria Solferino
Additional contact information
Nazaria Solferino: University of Calabria-Unical

No wp31, Econometica Working Papers from Econometica

Abstract: We document with a randomized experiment that being spectators and, to a lesser extent, stakeholders with veil of ignorance on relative payoffs, induces subjects who can choose distribution criteria to prefer rewarding talent (vis à vis effort, chance or strict egalitarianism) after guaranteeing a minimal egalitarian base. The removal of the veil of ignorance reduces dramatically such choice since most players opt or revise their decision in favour of the criterion which maximizes their own payoff (and, by doing so, end up being farther from the maximin choice). Large part (but not all) of the stakeholders? choices before the removal of the veil of ignorance are driven by their performance beliefs since two thirds of them choose under the veil the criterion in which they assume to perform relatively better.

Keywords: Distributive Justice; Perceived Fairness; Talent, Chance and Effort; Veil of Ignorance (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46
Date: 2011-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe and nep-exp
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

Downloads: (external link)
http://econometica.it/wp/wp31.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Spectators versus stakeholders with or without veil of ignorance: The difference it makes for justice and chosen distribution criteria (2011)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ent:wpaper:wp31

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Econometica Working Papers from Econometica Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Rizzolli ().