Social norms on rent seeking and preferences for redistribution

Fabio Sabatini, Francesco Sarracino and Eiji Yamamura ()

No wp55, Econometica Working Papers from Econometica

Abstract: Empirical studies have shown that preferences for redistribution are sig- nificantly correlated with expectations of future mobility and the belief that society offers equal opportunities. We add to previous research by inves- tigating the role of individual and social norms on rent seeking. We find that the individual propensity for stigmatizing rent seeking significantly and positively affects preferences for redistribution. On the other hand, living in an area where most citizens do not stigmatize rent seeking, makes men more favourable to redistribution, which may be seen as a social equalizer in an unfair society that does not offer equal opportunities to all. This effect does not hold for women, whose preference for redistribution is negatively associated to the regional tolerance of rent seeking.

Keywords: redistribution; welfare state; civic values; social norms; social capital (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D39 D63 D64 D72 H26 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Social norms on rent seeking and preferences for redistribution (2014)
Working Paper: Social norms on rent seeking and preferences for redistribution (2014)
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