Thou shalt not steal. Taking aversion with legal property claims

Marco Faillo (), Matteo Rizzolli and Stephan Tontrup
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Stephan Tontrup: New York University

No wp63, Econometica Working Papers from Econometica

Abstract: Abstract Some recent experimental literature on the taking game (a variation of the dictator game) suggests that human subjects may generally be taking averse, implying that the moral cost of taking exceeds the moral cost of not giving. In our experiment, our subjects could decide to take tangible objects (lottery scratchcards) brought from outside the lab and thus legally owned by other subjects. This legal treatment was compared with a more standard one where subjects earned their scratchcards inside the lab. Evidence is provided of a (weak) taking aversion that is greater when property is established inside the lab via an effort task than when it is pre-existing and legally enforceable outside the lab

Keywords: property rights; dictator game; bully game; taking game; taking aversion; stealing; anonymity; effort; scratchcards. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D23 K11 P14 P26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-hpe and nep-law
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Related works:
Journal Article: Thou shalt not steal: Taking aversion with legal property claims (2019)
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