The evolution of revolution: Is splintering inevitable?

Atin Basuchoudhary and Laura Razzolini ()

Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2018, vol. 13, issue 1, 43-54

Abstract: We use an evolutionary model to study splintering within rebel groups. We assume that rebels possess cultural traits that encourage cooperation, defection (splintering), or a trigger behavior like Tit-For-Tat. We characterize the dynamic process by which rebels’ discount rates determine whether splintering will occur in the rebel population even when cooperation is otherwise efficient. The results suggest that political action by governments that make rebels impatient also increases the likelihood of rebel group splintering. This may be counterproductive from a government’s point of view. Our article closes a gap in the literature by providing a theoretical model for how rebel groups form. Policies that affect the patience of rebels and change the cultural context within rebel groups influence the likelihood of rebel group splintering. This article’s contribution to the literature is twofold. First, it applies an established modeling approach to understand how even otherwise cohesive rebellions can splinter as a consequence of exogenous shocks that change rebels’ time horizons. Second, we highlight how cultural context can influence this splintering process.

Keywords: Evolutionary game theory; rebels; splintering; violence; counterinsurgency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2018
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:epc:journl:v:13:y:2018:i:1:p:43-54

DOI: 10.15355/epsj.13.1.43

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