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Conflict as the absence of contract

S. Mansoob Murshed ()
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S. Mansoob Murshed: Birmingham Business School, University of Birmingham, Institute of Social Studies, The Hague, and Center for the Study of Civil War (CSCW), Peace Research Institute, Oslo

Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2009, vol. 4, issue 1, 32-38

Abstract: Two phenomena have been recently utilized to explain conflict onset: greed and grievance. The former reflects elite competition over valuable natural resource rents. The latter argues that grievance fuels conflict. Central to grievance are concepts of interethnic or horizontal inequality. Identity formation is also crucial to intrastate conflict, as it overcomes the collective action problem. Conflict can rarely be explained by greed alone. The greed explanation for conflict duration and secessionist wars works best in cross-country studies but has to make way for grievance-based arguments in quantitative country-case studies. Grievances and horizontal inequalities may be better at explaining why conflicts begin, but not necessarily why they persist. Neither the presence of greed or grievance is sufficient for the outbreak of violent conflict, something which requires the breakdown of the social contract

Keywords: Civil war; greed versus grievance; social contract (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 O10 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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