Designing institutions for global security

Rupayan Gupta ()
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Rupayan Gupta: Gabelli School of Business, Roger Williams University, Bristol, RI, USA

Economics of Peace and Security Journal, 2012, vol. 7, issue 2, 25-32

Abstract: The article merges aspects of alliance theory with bargaining theory and mechanism design. Illustrated with a numeric example, it models a within-alliance neutral agency whose purpose it is to propose an efficient level of public good provision for the alliance as a whole and suggests a mechanism by which to overcome incentives for inefficient provision. The article concludes with an extensive discussion for future research needs on alliance mechanism design, e.g., suggesting that a review of the literatures on central bank design and similar institutions might be helpful.

Keywords: Institutional design; mechanism design; alliance theory; bargaining theory; security; peace (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D74 H53 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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