Subprime Rescue Plans: Backdoor Bank Bailouts

Dean Baker

CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs from Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract: This report analyzes recent proposals suggesting that the government buy up or guarantee bad mortgage debt in an attempt to slow the increasing number of foreclosures the nation has seen in the wake of the housing market's meltdown. The study, which focuses on the plan put forth by the Office of Thrift Supervision, shows that banks and mortgage holders end up being the true beneficiaries of such plans at the expense of taxpayers and with few gains for the majority of homeowners currently facing foreclosure.

Keywords: foreclosure; mortgage; subprime (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G G21 G28 G38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9 pages
Date: 2008-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:epo:papers:2008-07

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