Working Paper: Rents and Inefficiency in the Patent and Copyright System: Is There a Better Route?

Dean Baker

CEPR Reports and Issue Briefs from Center for Economic and Policy Research (CEPR)

Abstract: This paper analyzes the evidence for rents due to the patent and copyright systems for financing innovation and creative work. It notes research suggesting that in both the patent and copyright system, the costs in the form of monopoly pricing and rent-seeking activity outweigh the benefits. It then proposes alternatives to the patent and copyright system. The Kauffman Foundation helped support this work.

JEL-codes: I I1 I14 I18 K K11 O O31 O33 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 60 pages
Date: 2016-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-knm and nep-pke
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:epo:papers:2016-12

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