Transatlantic Investment Treaty Protection

Lauge Poulsen, Jonathan Bonnitcha and Jason Yackee

CEPS Papers from Centre for European Policy Studies

Abstract: This paper presents an informal cost-benefit analysis of the inclusion of investment protection provisions, including investor-state arbitration, in an investment chapter in TTIP. The analysis is conducted from the perspective of the EU and its member states. It argues that there is little evidence to suggest that investor-state arbitration will provide the EU with meaningful benefits, such as increased foreign investment from the US. In contrast, investor-state arbitration may impose non-trivial costs, in the form of litigation expenses and reduced policy space. This is due to the huge volume of US investment that would be covered by the investment chapter, as well as the fact that an investment chapter would almost certainly give foreign investors greater rights than they currently enjoy under EU and member state law. We conclude that, from the perspective of the EU, the case for including investor-state arbitration in TTIP is weak. Although we do not conduct a cost-benefit analysis from the perspective of the US, such an analysis would likely raise similar issues.

Pages: 37 pages
Date: 2015-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-int and nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR102_ISDS.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eps:cepswp:10295

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPS Papers from Centre for European Policy Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margarita Minkova ().