Institutional Moral Hazard in the Multi-tiered Regulation of Unemployment and Social Assistance Benefits

Frank Vandenbroucke and Chris Luigjes

CEPS Papers from Centre for European Policy Studies

Abstract: This paper studies eight countries in which the regulation of unemployment benefits and related benefits and the concomitant activation of unemployed individuals has a multi-tiered architecture. It assesses their experiences and tries to understand possible problems of ‘institutional moral hazard’ that may emerge in the context of a hypothetical European Unemployment Benefit Scheme. This paper has been prepared at the request of the European Commission as Task 1A of the research project on the Feasibility and Added Value of a European Unemployment Benefit Scheme. The principal authors are Frank Vandenbroucke (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands) and Chris Luigjes (University of Amsterdam, the Netherlands). Donna Wood (University of Victoria, Canada) is co-author for the Canadian case study and country fiche. Kim Lievens (KULeuven) is co-author of the Belgian case study and country fiche.

Pages: 89 pages
Date: 2016-04
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.ceps.eu/system/files/SR%20No%20137%20M ... %20reg%20of%20UB.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 404 Not Found

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eps:cepswp:11526

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in CEPS Papers from Centre for European Policy Studies Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Margarita Minkova ().