Collusion Detection in Public Procurement with Limited Information

Bedri Tas

No 1127, Working Papers from Economic Research Forum

Abstract: Public procurement data sets usually lack detailed data that are needed to implement existing methods. We design a method to identify and test for bid rigging in procurement auctions with limited information. The method can be applied to limited data sets using standard econometric tools and software. We implement the methodology to a unique data set about all Turkish public procurement auctions in years 2005-2012, numbering 565,297. We uncover the structure of collusive behavior in Turkish public procurement auctions. We find that collusion significantly increases procurement costs and decreases procurement efficiency.

Pages: 27
Date: 2017-10-08, Revised 2017-10-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ara, nep-com and nep-des
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