Economic Voting Under Single-Party and Coalition Governments: Evidence From The Turkish Case

Ali Akarca ()

No 1128, Working Papers from Economic Research Forum

Abstract: Strength of economic voting under single-party and coalition governments is investigated in the case of Turkey. The vote equation developed for this purpose is fitted to data covering 31 parliamentary and local administrations elections held between 1950 and 2015, and considers incumbency advantage, political inertia, strategic voting by the electorate, and political realignments as well. It is found that voters hold coalition governments less responsible for economic performance than single-party governments and minor members of a coalition government less responsible than its major member. The latter gap widens as fragmentation in the government increases numerically and/or ideologically. In governments involving many parties and parties with significantly different ideologies, some of the junior coalition members benefit rather than suffer from a bad economy. These findings may explain, at least partially, why economic performance is poor under coalition governments, particularly under those combining both left and right wing parties.

Pages: 21
Date: 2017-17-08, Revised 2017
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