A Model of Political Uprisings

Raimundo Soto () and Samir Makdisi
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Raimundo Soto: Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile
Samir Makdisi: American University at Beirut and ERF

No 1631, Working Papers from Economic Research Forum

Abstract: Political violence is ubiquitous in many regions of the world, in particular the Middle East. This paper makes two contributions to our understanding of the outbreak of civil conflicts. We first extend the authoritarian bargain model to include uncertainty regarding the potential transfers available to the ruler to appease popular discontent. In our model, citizens care more for their “share of the pie” than the absolute size of the bargain transfer. We also expand the set of policies available to the ruler by including political repression. The second contribution is empirical: contrary to most of the literature, we use discrete-variable dynamic panel data models to consider that the likelihood of observing a civil war in a country at any point in time depends on having observed a conflict in the previous periods. This allow for proper modelling of unobserved heterogeneity, in particular with regards to initial conditions.

Pages: 36
Date: 2023-03-20, Revised 2023-03-20
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