Explicating social action: arguing or bargaining

Erik Oddvar Eriksen

No 8, RECON Online Working Papers Series from RECON

Abstract: Jon Elster has a clear view of the role of norms and impartiality in collective decision making processes, but does not ascribe to them the power to explain action. Hence, the paradox: If it is only public reasons that can justify outcomes, how can private desires be the causes of the same outcomes? Reasons and norms must be given explanatory force, but this requires methodological individualism expanded to methodological interactionism. Here promises appear not merely as bargaining chips, arguing more than an aggregation device and normative questions not as irrational. Because both arguing and strategic communication exist, and it is as hard to identify the former as the latter, one should not let one take precedence over the other on theoretical grounds. The problem is not theoretical, but methodological.

Keywords: collective bargaining; common interest; deliberative democracy; discourse; functionalism; institutionalism; legitimacy; methodological issues; normative political theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2009-08-15
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth and nep-pol
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