French GPs’ willingness to delegate tasks: may financial incentives balance risk aversion?

Simon Combes (), Alain Paraponaris and Yann Videau ()

No 2019-09, Erudite Working Paper from Erudite

Date: 2019
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-eur and nep-upt
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Related works:
Working Paper: French GPs’ Willingness to Delegate Tasks: May Financial Incentives Balance Risk Aversion? (2019)
Working Paper: French GPs’ Willingness to Delegate Tasks: May Financial Incentives Balance Risk Aversion? (2019)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eru:erudwp:wp19-09

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