Do strong family ties inhibit trust?

John Ermisch and Diego Gambetta

No 2008-37, ISER Working Paper Series from Institute for Social and Economic Research

Abstract: We provide direct evidence that people with strong family ties have a lower level of trust in strangers than people with weak family ties, and argue that this association is causal. We also investigate the mechanisms that underlie this effect, and provide evidence that these revolve around the level of outward exposure: factors that limit exposure limit subjects’ experience as well as motivation to deal with strangers. Our findings are based on experimental data derived from a new design of the ‘trust game’ combined with panel survey data, both drawn from a near-representative sample of the British population.

Date: 2008-11-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-lab and nep-soc
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Journal Article: Do strong family ties inhibit trust? (2010)
Working Paper: Do Strong Family Ties Inhibit Trust? (2010)
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