Inequality Aversion in Ultimatum Games with Asymmetric Conflict Payoffs - A Theoretical and Experimental Analysis -

Sven Fischer ()

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Assuming inequality averse subjects as modeled by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) or in the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) in ultimatum games with asymmetric conflict payoffs allows to make predictions especially concerning responder acceptance thresholds. These predictions are tested in a laboratory experiment eliciting proposer offers and respondent's acceptance thresholds using the strategy vector method. By and large both models make good predictions. However, they are unable to convincingly explain the observed selfishness on behalf of responders in ultimatum games favoring them in conflict. Overall, observed behavior gives rise to a context dependent interpretation of inequality aversion and to Knez and Camerer's 1995 observation that subjects form 'egocentric assessments of fairness'.

Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2005-10
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-exp, nep-gth and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2005-36.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Failed to connect to FTP server papers.econ.mpg.de: No such host is known.

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2005-36

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.econ.mpg. ... arch/ESI/discuss.php

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Karin Richter ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).