Political Parties and Rent-seeking through Networks

Topi Miettinen and Panu Poutvaara

Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group

Abstract: Anti-corruption laws forbid selling nominations to public jobs. Even if bribing is ruled out, those interested in the nominations may invest in good relationships with the nominators. This provides a legal way to influence the decision. Such networking is costly, however. Thus, rent-seeking results in excessive networking. We argue that efficiency may be improved if political parties interfere with the nominations. Political parties may reduce wasteful networking, thanks to exclusive membership contracts. Parties can require that politicians belonging to the party promote the nomination of other party members, thus, reducing incentives to cultivate inter-party connections.

Keywords: Political parties; Political Nominations; Rent-seeking; Connections; Networks; Two-sided Platforms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D85 H8 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2007-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-net, nep-pol and nep-soc
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
ftp://papers.econ.mpg.de/esi/discussionpapers/2006-28.pdf (application/pdf)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 500 Failed to connect to FTP server papers.econ.mpg.de: No such host is known.

Related works:
Working Paper: Political Parties and Rent-seeking through Networks (2006)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:esi:discus:2006-28

Ordering information: This working paper can be ordered from
http://www.econ.mpg. ... arch/ESI/discuss.php

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Papers on Strategic Interaction from Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Karin Richter ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).