On R&D Information Sharing and Merger

Uday Sinha

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: The paper deals with the issue of information sharing in a Cournot duopoly by an innovating firm in the face of a merger with its rival. The innovating firm would share information about the cost realization with its rival provided the market size is relatively small or, the R&D technology is relatively more efficient in a medium market size. However, in a large market, or in a medium market size with less efficient R&D technology, the innovating firm does not share information with its rival. They also show that the social welfare may be higher under incomplete information regime. [Working Paper No. 145]

Keywords: Information sharing; market size; R&D; merger and welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2010-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-cta, nep-ind, nep-ino, nep-ipr, nep-pr~ and nep-tid
Note: Institutional Papers
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Related works:
Journal Article: On R&D information sharing and merger (2013)
Working Paper: On R&D Information Sharing and Merger (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ess:wpaper:id:2908

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