Private Returns to Public Office

Raymond Fisman, Florian Schulz and Vikrant Vig

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: The wealth accumulation of Indian parliamentarians using public disclosures required of all candidates since 2003 are studied. Annual asset growth of winners is on average 3 to 6 percentage points higher than runners-up. By performing a within-constituency com- parison where both runner-up and winner run in consecutive elections, and by looking at the subsample of very close elections, a range of alternative explanations for differential earnings of politicians and a relevant control group are ruled out. The “winner's premium" comes from parliamentarians holding positions in the Council of Ministers, with asset re- turns 13 to 29 percentage points higher than non-winners. The benefit of winning is also concentrated among incumbents, because of low asset growth for incumbent non-winners. [BREAD Working paper]. URL:[http://ipl.econ.duke.edu/bread/papers/working/344.pdf].

Keywords: Private Returns, Public Office, Information disclosure; Indian politics; Regression discontinuity, Annual asset growth, Indian parliamentarians, asset growth, candidates, salary earnings, politicians' motivations (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012-05
Note: Institutional Papers
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

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Related works:
Journal Article: The Private Returns to Public Office (2014)
Working Paper: Private Returns to Public Office (2012)
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