The Political Economy of MGNREGS Spending in Andhra Pradesh

Megan Sheahan (), Yanyan Liu (), Christopher Barrett and Sudha Narayanan

Working Papers from eSocialSciences

Abstract: Are ostensibly demand-driven public programs less susceptible to political clientelism even when private goods are allocated? This is examined using expenditure data at the local level from India’s National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme.

Keywords: India; political economy; clientelism; project allocation; employment guarantee; MGNREGS; Andhra Pradesh; private goods; public programs; expenditure data; private; economic growth; poverty reduction (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2014-08
Note: Institutional Papers
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Related works:
Working Paper: The political economy of MGNREGS spending in Andhra Pradesh (2014)
Working Paper: The Political economy of MGNREGS spending in Andhra Pradesh (2014)
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