Entry in first-price auctions with signaling

Olivier Bos and Tom Truyts

No 539875, Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: We study the optimal entry fee in a symmetric private value first-price auction with signaling, in which the participation decisions and the auction outcome are used by an outside observer to infer the bidders’ types. We show that this auction has a unique fully separating equilibrium bidding function. The expected revenue maximizing entry fee is the maximal fee that guarantees full participation.

Date: 2016-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ind and nep-mic
Note: paper number DPS 16.05
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Published in Department of Economics. Discussion paper series,, pages 1-16

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Related works:
Journal Article: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2023)
Working Paper: Entry in First-Price Auctions with Signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in first-price auctions with signaling (2022)
Working Paper: Entry in First-price Auctions with Signaling (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:539875

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