Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems

Johannes Spinnewyn and Frans Spinnewyn
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Johannes Spinnewijn

Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven

Abstract: We propose a mechanism which implements a unique solution to the bargaining problem with two players in subgame-perfect equilibrium. Players start by making claims and accept a compromise only if they cannot gain by pursuing their claim in an ultimatum. The player offering the lowest resistance to his opponent’s claim can propose a compromise. The unique solution depends on the extent to which claims can be revised. If no revisions are allowed, compatible claims implement the Nash solution. If all revisions are allowed, maximal claims implement the Kalai-Smorodinsky solution.

Date: 2008-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
https://lirias.kuleuven.be/bitstream/123456789/211395/1/DPS0832.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems (2015)
Working Paper: Revising claims and resisting ultimatums in bargaining problems (2015)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:ceswps:ces0832

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven
Bibliographic data for series maintained by library EBIB ().