Are NIMBY's commuters?

Bert Saveyn

Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series from KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment

Abstract: This paper considers a metropolitan area where residents can commute between several jurisdictions. These residents show NIMBY behavior (Not-In-My-Backyard). They try to preserve their living quality by pushing the polluting economic activity to the neighboring jurisdictions and keep their labor income as commuters. This induces a race-to-the-top among jurisdictions. Fiercer competition due to a higher number of jurisdictions intensifies this race-to-the-top; whereas commuting costs, pollution taxes, payroll taxes and bigger jurisdictions increase the incentive for more pollution.

Keywords: Commuting; NIMBY; interjurisdictional competition; environmental federalism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H Q R (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 52 pages
Date: 2006-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-env, nep-geo and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Are NIMBY'S commuters? (2006)
Working Paper: Are NIMBY'S commuters? (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:ete:etewps:ete0604

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