Common ownership and market entry: Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry

Melissa Newham, Jo Seldeslachts and Albert Banal-Estanol

No 623896, Working Papers of Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven from KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Management, Strategy and Innovation, Leuven

Abstract: Common ownership - where two rms are at least partially owned by the same investor - and its impact on product market outcomes has recently drawn a lot of attention from scholars and practitioners alike. Theoretical and empirical research suggests that common ownership can lead to higher prices. This paper focuses on implications for market entry. To estimate the e ect of common ownership on entry decisions, we focus on the pharmaceutical industry. In particular, we consider the entry decisions of generic pharmaceutical rms into drug markets opened up by the end of regulatory protection in the US. We rst provide a theoretical framework that shows that a higher level of common ownership between the brand rm (incumbent) and potential generic entrant reduces the generic's incentives to entry. We provide robust evidence for this prediction. The e ect is large: a one-standard-deviation increase in common ownership decreases the probability of generic entry by 9-13%. We extend our basic theoretical framework and allow for multiple entrants. Our model shows that for su ciently high levels of common ownership, the classical idea of entry decisions being strategic substitutes can be reversed into being strategic complements. Our empirical results provide some support for these predictions.

Keywords: Market Entry; Ownership Structure; Pharma (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55
Date: 2018-05-31
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Related works:
Working Paper: Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry (2018)
Working Paper: Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Industry (2018)
Working Paper: Common Ownership and Market Entry: Evidence from Pharmaceutical Industry (2018)
Working Paper: Common ownership and market entry: Evidence from the pharmaceutical industry (2018)
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