Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication

Hans Gersbach

No 11/143, CER-ETH Economics working paper series from CER-ETH - Center of Economic Research (CER-ETH) at ETH Zurich

Abstract: We present a model of elections in which interest group donations allow candidates to shift policy positions. We show that if donations were prohibited, then a unique equilibrium regarding the position choices of candidates would exist. With unrestricted financing of political campaigns two equilibria emerge, depending on whether a majority of interest groups runs to support the leftist or rightist candidate. The equilibria generate a variety of new features of campaign games and may help identify the objective functions of candidates empirically.

Keywords: elections; campaign contributions; interest groups (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 30 pages
Date: 2011-04
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Related works:
Journal Article: Campaigns, political mobility, and communication (2014)
Working Paper: Campaigns, Political Mobility, and Communication (2009)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eth:wpswif:11-143

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