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A Monetary Model of Banking Crises

Keiichiro Kobayashi

Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)

Abstract: We propose a new model for policy analysis of banking crises (or systemic bank runs) based on the monetary framework developed by Lagos and Wright (2005). If banks cannot enforce loan repayment and have to secure loans by collateral, a banking crisis due to coordination failure among depositors can occur in response to a sunspot shock, and the banks become insolvent as a result of the bank runs. The model is tractable and easily embedded into a standard business cycle model. The model naturally makes a distinction between money and goods, while most of the existing banking models do not. This distinction enables us to clarify further the workings of banking crises and crisis management policies. In particular, we may be able to use this framework to compare the efficacy of fiscal stimulus, monetary easing, and bank reforms as recovery efforts from the current global financial crisis.

Pages: 47 pages
Date: 2009-07
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ban, nep-dge and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eti:dpaper:09036

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