Evolution of Standards and Innovation

Reiko Aoki and Yasuhiro Arai

Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)

Abstract: We examine how a standard evolves when both a standard consortium or firm (incumbent) and an outside firm (potential entrant) innovate to improve the technology. The incumbent improves to deter entry, and the entrant can invest to counter the incumbent's attempt. We show that only when the technology is mature and inertia is sufficiently low will there be entry leading to the coexistence of both standards. When the technology is in its infancy, the incumbent deters entry by technology improvement (upgrade) for any level of inertia. The entrant is never able to drive the incumbent out of the market (replacement). Our results suggest that competition policy to control inertia is not a substitute for policies to promote technological innovation, and that coordination of the two policies is essential.

Pages: 41 pages
Date: 2015-12
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-bec, nep-com, nep-ino, nep-knm and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eti:dpaper:15136

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