Structural Estimation of the Scoring Auction Model

Jun Nakabayashi and Yohsuke Hirose

Discussion papers from Research Institute of Economy, Trade and Industry (RIETI)

Abstract: This paper offers an analytical framework for the scoring auction. We first characterize a symmetric monotone equilibrium in the scoring auction. We then propose a semiparametric procedure to identify the joint distribution of the bidder's multidimensional signal from scoring auction data. Our approach allows for a broad class of scoring rules in settings with multidimensional signals. Finally, using our analytical framework, we conduct an empirical experiment to estimate the impacts of the change of auction formats and scoring rules. The data on scoring auctions are from public procurement auctions for construction projects in Japan.

Pages: 66 pages
Date: 2016-02
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ecm
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eti:dpaper:16008

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